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Abstract
In this work we investigate the interrelations among technology, output and employ-
ment in the different states of the U.S. economy (recessions vs. expansions). More
precisely, we estimate different threshold vector autoregression (TVAR) models with
TFP, hours, and GDP, employing the latter as threshold variable, and we assess the
ensuing generalized impulse responses of GDP and hours as to TFP shocks. We
find that positive productivity shocks, while spurring GDP growth, display a neg-
ative effect on hours worked at least on impact, independently of the state of the
economy. In the 1957-2011 period, the effects of productivity shocks on employment
are abundantly negative in downturns, but they are not significantly different from
zero in good times. However, the impact of TFP shocks in different business cycle
regimes depends on the chosen sample: after the mid eighties (1984-2011), produc-
tivity shocks increase hours during recessions. Finally, we express and test some
conjectures that might have caused the changes in the responses in different time
periods.
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1 Introduction
In this work, we estimate several threshold vector autoregression (TVAR) models to inves-
tigate the interrelations between productivity, output and employment in different states
of the U.S. economy (recessions vs. expansions).
The debate about the (positive or negative) impact of technology on employment has
always had a central role in economic theory (see Vivarelli, 2007, for a survey) from Ri-
cardo to the recent discussion about the possible job destroying effects of robots. At
the business-cycle frequencies, the impact of productivity shocks on employment is not
completely settled. In Real Business Cycle (RBC) models, TFP shocks positively affect
output and hours worked both in the short-run and in the long-run. However, several
contributions (e.g., Gali, 1999; Francis and Ramey, 2005; Basu et al., 2006) have ques-
tioned such results, finding that productivity has a negative impact on worked hours in
the short-run. Yet, the effects of technology shocks on employment appear to be milder
since the mid eighties (e.g., Galí and Gambetti, 2009).
Recently, a stream of literature has found that non-linearities in the economic system
can lead to different impact of (monetary and fiscal) shocks according to the state of the
economy (see e.g. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012a) and financial markets (Mittnik
and Semmler, 2013; Ferraresi et al., 2014). Technology shocks can be highly dependent on
the state of the economy as their effects can be deeply intertwined with (i) the monetary
policy regimes (see e.g. Gali and Rabanal, 2004); (ii) the dynamics of labor markets and
investment volatility (e.g. Justiniano and Primiceri, 2008; Nucci and Riggi, 2011); (iii)
the changing nature of recessions and the role played by financial markets (see, e.g.,
Petrosky-Nadeau, 2013).
In line with the conjectures coming from the aforementioned literature, we investigate
the possible interrelations between technology, output and employment in a non-linear,
state dependent framework. More precisely, we estimate over several time spans (the
longest being 1957:1-2011:4) different threshold vector autoregression (TVAR) models
with TFP, hours, and GDP, employing the latter variable as threshold. We then assess the
dynamics of the ensuing generalized impulse response functions (GIRF) to study whether
TFP shocks affect differently hours and GDP in recessions vis-à-vis recessions. Finally,
we also analyze the presence of possible structural break in the relationship between
productivity and employment considering different sub-samples (1957-1979 vs. 1984-
2011).
We find that positive TFP shocks spur GDP growth, but display a negative effect on
hours worked at least on impact, independently of the state of the economy. In the longest
time period, the effects of productivity shocks on employment are abundantly negative
during downturns, but they are not significantly different from zero in good times. In
that, our work generalizes the results of Gali (1999) and Basu et al. (2006). We also find
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that the dynamics of hours worked in the aftermath of a technology shock is mostly due to
the response of the number of employees rather than hours per worker. Adjustments via
the extensive margin appears then more relevant than those occurring along the intensive
margin.
Moreover, our results suggest that the chosen time period affect how hours and GDP
react to TFP shocks in good or bad times. Prior to the mid eighties, the results are in
line with those obtained in the longest period. However, since the Great Moderation,
positive productivity shocks increase hours during recessions. Such results are preserved
also when the Great Recession is taken into account. Our analysis generalizes the results
in Gali et al. (2003) and Galí and Gambetti (2009) about the milder effects of TFP
shocks on employment during the Great Moderation. Indeed, we show that low growth
periods are responsible for the observed switch in the pattern. Finally, we search for
possible explanations for the observed switch. Although we did not find a silver-bullet
explanation, changes in the responses of different series suggest that monetary and fiscal
policies, investment and financial frictions exerted a relevant role via aggregate demand.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we revise the related
literature. In Section 3, we present the data and our methodology. We discuss our main
results in Section 5. In Section 6 we study possible transmission mechanisms for our
time-varying results. Finally, in Section 7, we conclude.
2 Related literature
Our work is related to two different streams of literature. The first one studies the ef-
fects of technology shocks on output and employment (Gali, 1999; Basu et al., 2006).
According to this literature technology shocks generate negative comovements between
productivity and hours worked and between output and hours which are at odds with
results from standard real business cycle (RBC) models that postulate positive relation-
ships (see Ramey, 2016; Gali and Rabanal, 2004, for a comprehensive discussion). This
strand of research is complemented by further evidence about the time varying effects
of technology shocks, which are thought to have become less contractionary during the
Great Moderation era (e.g., Gali et al., 2003) (see Section 6). Moreover, Ng and Wright
(2013) find that labor productivity turns from procyclical to countercyclical since the mid
eighties (see also Fernald and Wang, 2015). However, the debate about the effects of
technology shocks on employment and output is not completely settled, as different spec-
ifications and identification strategies may yield possibly different results (e.g., Gali and
Rabanal, 2004; Christiano et al., 2003; Fernald, 2007; Dedola and Neri, 2007; Lindé, 2009),
even though most results convey the message of contractionary effects of tech shocks with
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respect to hours worked at least in the short-run.1
The second stream of empirical literature studies regime switching in macroeconomic
dynamics. This relatively new strand of research has blossomed in the aftermath of the
Great Recession and it studies the asymmetric effects of fiscal and monetary policies as
well as of other real and financial shocks, depending of the state of the economy. Gener-
ally, such studies resort to a wide set of regime switching models ranging from threshold
vector autoregressions (TVAR), to vector smooth transition autoregressions (VSTAR)
and Markov-Switching models. Regimes shifts are usually sparked by threshold variables
related to the state of the real economy (recession or expansion, see e.g., Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko, 2012b,a; Bachmann and Sims, 2012), or to financial markets (see e.g.
Mittnik and Semmler, 2013; Ferraresi et al., 2014).2
3 Methodology
In order to assess whether the response of hours and GDP with respect to technology
shocks depends on the state of the economy, recessions vis-à-vis expansions, we estimate
a bunch of threshold vector autoregression models (TVAR) which display a number of
appealing features. First, the threshold variable is considered as endogenous. This allows
one to study regime switches, which result from shocks hitting another variable within the
system. Second, TVARs are very simple to estimate: within each regime, the parameters
can be recovered by ordinary least squares (OLS). However, once estimated, the state
dependent dynamics of TVARs allows for non-linear and asymmetric impulse-response
functions.
Let us consider a TVAR model with two regimes. Given the vector of endogenous
variables (y) and the threshold variable (w, belonging to y), the model can be represented
as follows:
yt = cj +
p∑
i=0
Aj,iyt−i + t,j, (1)
where cj is a constant vector; j = 1 if wt−d < r and j = 2 otherwise; r is the value of
the threshold; d is the lag of the threshold variable relevant for regime changes; p is the
autoregressive order; and Aj,i is the matrix of coefficients of regime j and lag i. Each
regime is characterized by a variance-covariance matrix Σj. Note that the TVAR model
1The main differences arise because of i) hours entering the relation in first-differences (Gali, 1999;
Francis and Ramey, 2005) vs. levels (Christiano et al., 2003); ii) long-run restrictions and adjusted
TFP measure of technology (Gali, 1999; Basu et al., 2006) vs. sign restrictions (Dedola and Neri, 2007);
identification of different sources of technical change (Fisher, 2006). In the present work we stick to first
differenced hours, so as to avoid to uncover spurious regime change. Nevertheless, our results are broadly
robust to different specifications. Moreover, we identify technology shocks by using the adjusted measure
of TFP proposed by Fernald (2012), in line with Basu et al. (2006).
2On the theoretical side, Canzoneri et al. (2016) develop a model which accounts for time-varying
fiscal multipliers depending upon the state of the economy (recessions vs. expansions).
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is linear within each regime, but the changes in the parameters across regimes account
for non-linearities.
TVARs can be estimated via OLS conditional on the threshold variable, wt−d, the num-
ber of regimes and the lag order p. Identification can be performed employing standard
procedures used in the linear framework (e.g. Cholesky).
Before estimation and identification, one has first to test for linearity. We apply a
battery of Tsay (1998) tests in order to evaluate the null hypothesis that our VAR models
are linear. If the null is rejected, there are multiple regimes, and we can estimate a
threshold model. As suggested by Tsay (1998), we select the lag of the threshold variable
according to the maximum test statistic. Once the lag order is fixed, we search over
the (observed) threshold values and choose the ones which minimize the sum of squared
residuals.3
After the TVAR is estimated, the next step consists in analyzing the impulse response
functions. In a non-linear setup, the reaction of an endogenous variable to a shock depends
on the past history, the state of the economy and the size of the shock under study at time
0, and the size and the sign of all the shocks hitting the economy within the period of
interest (a shock at time t may indeed trigger a switching of regime till time t+d, where d
is the estimated lag of the threshold). In order to average out the influences of history and
of all other shocks, simulation methods are necessary to recover the generalized impulse
response functions (GIRF; Koop et al., 1996). In particular, if we define εt as the shock
to the variable we are interested in, a horizon m, and a history Ωt−1, we can define the
GIRF as:
GIRF = E [Xt+m|εt, εt+1 = 0, . . . , εt+m = 0,Ωt−1]−
E [Xt+m|εt = 0, εt+1 = 0, . . . , εt+m = 0,Ωt−1] (2)
The algorithm employed to derive the generalized impulse response function is described
in Appendix B. In a nutshell, the idea is to simulate the model for any possible starting
point over the time horizon of interest by feeding the system with bootstrapped shocks
and to repeat the exercise by adding a new shock of a specific size (one time the standard
deviation of the fundamental shock in the linear model). The procedure is done hundreds
times with newly generated series of bootstrapped residuals. The responses to shocks
specific to a particular regime is recovered by averaging out the simulation results. As
suggested in Zheng (2013) and Schmidt (2013), we compute confidence bands by boot-
strapping the TVAR residuals (see Appendix B for the algorithm). In the GIRF presented
below, we report 68% confidence bands as suggested by Sims and Zha (1999).4
3Alternatively, we can select the lag of the threshold according to the sum of squared residuals. Our
results are nevertheless robust to the estimation method employed.
4Codes for linearity tests, estimation, GIRFs and bootstrapped confidence bands are written in Gretl,
an open-source software available at http://gretl.sourceforge.net/.
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4 Data and model
We use quarterly U.S. time series. Our main sample goes from 1957:1 to 2011:4. Such a
time span allows us to increase the minimum number of observations in each regime and
to perform a relatively large number of sub-exercises.5
Our main model contains (according to Cholesky order) adjusted total factor produc-
tivity (TFP), GDP and hours worked.6 Quarterly data about adjusted TFP and hours
worked are drawn from Fernald (2012).7
We first estimate the model over the whole sample and then we focus on different sub-
periods in order to account for possible structural breaks. First, we exclude the Great
Recession, letting our sample go to the second quarter of 2008. We then perform an
investigation in the spirit of Galí and Gambetti (2009) to separate the pre-Volcker era
(1957:1-1979:2) from the Volcker-Greenspan-Bernanke period (1984:1-2011:4).8 Finally,
we also jettison the Great Recession from the Great Moderation, considering the period
1984:1-2008:2 and show that our results are not qualitatively affected.9
We order adjusted TFP first in our TVAR, as the residuals of such equation should
not be contemporaneously correlated with the other ones. This is in line with theoretical
macroeconomic literature (e.g. real business cycle models) as well as with the method
employed by Basu et al. (2006).10 We then place GDP and finally hours worked. In
other words, we assume that shocks to GDP are contemporaneously transmitted to hours
worked (i.e., higher production require more labor input, but not viceversa).11
Our threshold variable is a moving average of lag four of the quarterly rate of change
of GDP, which in turn is nothing but a rescaled yearly rate of change (see Figure 9 in
5The dates refer to the dependent variables. For example, in a VAR(4) the first observation used
according to our convention is 1956:1. The first observation is chosen in order to use a uniform sample
for all our exercises. Moreover, the sample ends in 2011:4 as when our empirical analysis was performed,
this was the last stable observation of National Accounts data according to the subsequent vintages from
FRED. The data is available from the authors upon request.
6Our main series are displayed together with NBER recessions bands in Figure 9 in Appendix C.
7In a recent contribuion Sims (2016) shows that subsequent vintages of utilization adjusted TFP are
not highly correlated with each other. Here we use the vintage produced in September 2014. However,
for the sake of comparison, we have checked with a more recent vintage and results do not qualitatively
change.
8Whereas there are good reasons to exclude the Volcker recession period (1979:3-1982:3) from the
analysis, we consider as a starting point of the Great Moderation the first quarter of 1984 as it is widely
accepted in the literature (e.g., Stock and Watson, 2012). Our results do not qualitatively change by
slightly shifting the beginning/end of samples.
9Our results are also unaffected by the choice of a shorter Volcker-Greenspan period consistent with
Gali et al. (2003). Moreover, we also check for an alternative sub-sampling strategy, in line with the
trend breaks in labor productivity growth identified by Fernald (2007). Again, the observed changes are
not driven by breaks in labor productivity growth but by a single fundamental shift from the mid 80s.
10It is indeed very likely that total factor productivity, once purged from cyclical capacity utilization,
does not respond to business cycle fluctuations within the same quarter. In fact, whereas standard TFP
is highly correlated with GDP growth (0.8); utilization adjusted TFP is not (0.2).
11This ordering is questionable since more hours worked should return, within the quarter, higher value
added (in terms of wages). However, our results do not change if we swap the two series in the system.
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Table 1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (GLS) tests applied to the MA(4) of the growth rate
of GDP (threshold variable) in the different sub-samples (p− values in parentheses). Lag
structure chosen according to modified AIC down from 4 lags. GDP: aggregate terms or
normalized with the civilian population.
Period GDP Specification Results
1957:1-2011:4 aggregate constant; 4 lags -4.47 (0.000)
1957:1-2008:2 aggregate constant; 4 lags -4.64 (0.000)
1957:1-2011:4 normalized constant; 4 lags -4.38 (0.000)
1957:1-2008:2 normalized constant; 4 lags -4.46 (0.000)
1957:1-1979:2 aggregate constant; 4 lags -3.23 (0.001)
1984:1-2011:4 normalized constant; 4 lags -2.54 (0.011)
1984:1-2008:2 normalized constant; 4 lags -2.50 (0.012)
1957:1-1979:2 normalized constant; 4 lags -3.01 (0.003)
1984:1-2011:4 normalized constant; 4 lags -2.59 (0.009)
1984:1-2008:2 normalized constant; 4 lags -2.62 (0.009)
the Appendix C). Yearly rates of change can be considered a rough measure to extract
business cycle components (Giannone et al., 2009) with the advantage that we can track
their dynamics endogenously within the TVAR. Moreover, modern macroeconomic theory
has justified it as a general source of multi regime dynamics (Canzoneri et al., 2016). In
order to assess the mean reverting properties of the threshold variable within the different
examined samples we run a battery of augmented Dickey-Fuller (GLS) tests, whose results
are reported in Table 1. The null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root is rejected for
all the tested series.
In Section 6 below, we will shed some light on the possible interactions between the
Great Moderation and the effects of technology shocks in alternative regimes. More specif-
ically, we will augment our three dimensional TVAR model with a variable at the time
concerning inflation (so as to check for monetary policy); private and public investment;
consumption and private inventories; credit markets interest rates; nominal and real wage
(see Section 6 for a discussion of the series included in this analysis and Appendix A for
more details about the data employed). Such exercises will be performed imposing the
same threshold values of the benchmark model.
5 Results
Let us now present the main results obtained by our empirical analysis. We structure the
discussion in three parts. First, in Section 5.1 we present the results obtained for the full
sample (1957-2011). We then consider the pre Volcker and post mid eighties sub-samples
(cf. Section 5.2). Finally, in Section 5.3, we assess the robustness of our results as to
different i) threshold values; ii) series entering the TVARs; iii) sub-sampling choices.
7
Table 2: Tsay tests. MA(4) of the growth rate of GDP (threshold variable). GDP:
aggregate terms or normalized with the civilian population.
Sample Employment Test Statistic (pvalue) Lag
1957:1-2011:4 aggregate hours 31.30 (0.002) 1
1957:1-2008:2 aggregate hours 39.16 (0.000) 1
1957:1-2011:4 normalized hours† 35.58 (0.000) 1
1957:1-2008:2 normalized hours† 34.32 (0.001) 1
1957:1-2011:4 hours per worker 22.42 (0.033) 4
1957:1-2008:2 hours per worker 23.03 (0.027) 4
1957:1-2011:4 employees 40.76 (0.000) 2
1957:1-2008:2 employees 51.69 (0.000) 2
1957:1-1979:2 aggregate hours 24.70 (0.016) 1
1984:1-2011:4 aggregate hours 19.51 (0.077) 3
1984:1-2008:2 aggregate hours 23.80 (0.022) 2
1957:1-1979:2 normalized hours† 24.17 (0.019) 1
1984:1-2011:4 normalized hours† 24.26 (0.019) 3
1984:1-2008:2 normalized hours† 18.13 (0.112) 2
1957:1-1979:2 hours per worker 27.76 (0.006) 3
1984:1-2011:4 hours per worker 25.86 (0.011) 3
1984:1-2008:2 hours per worker 17.79 (0.122) 1
1957:1-1979:2 employees 36.06 (0.000) 1
1984:1-2011:4 employees 28.37 (0.005) 2
1984:1-2008:2 employees 28.53 (0.005) 2
† MA(4) of normalized GDP rate of growth as threshold variable.
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Figure 1: Threshold variable (black line), threshold value (red line) and estimated reces-
sions (shaded area) in the main sample (1957-2011).
-1,5
-1
-0,5
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
1957Q1 1969Q1 1981Q1 1993Q1 2005Q1
5.1 Full sample period
We begin by performing Tsay linearity tests. As shown in Table 2, the Tsay test rejects
linearity (Figure 2). The max test statistics is reached at lag one, which we then impose
in our estimation procedure. The estimated threshold (the four quarter average of GDP
growth rates) is 1% and it leaves 85 observations in expansions and 135 in recessions.
Figure 1 reports the threshold variable together with the threshold value and the
estimated recessions. It suggests that after the mid eighties, the drop in GDP volatility
has induced a fall in the mean of the threshold variable, possibly making the estimated
threshold too high, so that the model spends too much time in the recession regime (more
on this in section 5.2 below).
Let us now consider the estimated impulse response function of GDP and hours worked
hours as to positive technology shocks (cf. Figure 2). The GIRFs show that TFP shocks
spur GDP in expansions, whereas their impact is much milder and not significantly dif-
ferent from zero during recessions. In contrast, positive technology shocks considerably
reduce employment during downturns, whereas their effects are negligible during expan-
sions (Figure 2).
Our results suggest the existence of state dependent transmission channels of technol-
ogy shocks to output and employment. In that, they generalize the findings of Gali (1999)
suggesting that the real-business-cycle explanation of business cycles is not credible as it
implies a positive correlation between productivity and hours. Indeed, we find that such
results are mainly due to the behavior of the economy during recessions. Technological
shocks do not appear to be a credible way out of recessions. This is in line with recent
macroeconomic research that points to the role of aggregate demand as escape route from
a recession.
We then try to shed more light on the effects of technology shocks by comparing the
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Figure 2: Generalized impulse response functions. Cumulative response of hours (upper
row) and GDP (bottom row) with respect to a 1% standard deviation positive shock
to adjusted TFP shock. Recessions (left column) vs. expansions (right column). 68%
confidence bands. Sample: 1957-2011.
-0,8
-0,7
-0,6
-0,5
-0,4
-0,3
-0,2
-0,1
0
0,1
0,2
0 5 10 15
-0,8
-0,7
-0,6
-0,5
-0,4
-0,3
-0,2
-0,1
0
0,1
0,2
0 5 10 15
-0,2
-0,1
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0 5 10 15
-0,2
-0,1
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0 5 10 15
10
Figure 3: Generalized impulse response functions. Cumulative response of average weekly
hours (upper row) and of the number of employees (bottom row) with respect to a 1%
standard deviation positive shock to adjusted TFP shock. Recessions (left column) vs.
expansions (right column). Sample: 1957-2011.
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response of employment over the extensive margin (i.e. number of employees) vis-à-vis
the intensive one (i.e. hours per worker). More specifically, we replace total hours in
the TVAR model with either the number of employees or the average weekly hours, we
test for linearity (Table 2), estimate the models and compute the ensuing GIRFs. Let
us start with average weekly hours (Fernald and Wang, 2015). The impulse response
functions depict quite similar patterns in the two macroeconomic regimes (cf. Figure
3). On the contrary, the reaction of the number of employees mimics closely that of total
hours, suggesting that most of the labor adjustment is done over the extensive margin (see
Figure 3). Indeed, the stronger and negative effects of productivity shocks on employment
in the low growth regime depend mostly on the lower number of employees. Such evidence
again supports the idea that aggregate demand can have a key role in the transmission
of technology shocks.
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Figure 4: Threshold variable (black line), threshold value (red line) and estimated reces-
sions (shaded area) in our sub-samples (1957-1979 vs. 1984-2011).
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5.2 Evidence from sub-sampling: Pre Volcker vs. the Great Mod-
eration & the Great Recession
The relationship between technology, output and employment may be subject to structural
breaks and change over time. Indeed, as shown by e.g. Gali et al. (2003) and Galí and
Gambetti (2009) among others, since the mid eighties, the effects of technology shocks on
hours worked have become milder. Moreover, Figure 1 suggest that the behavior of the
threshold variable seems to have mutated during the Great Moderation.
Building on the existing literature, we assess whether such a dynamics is present
also in a state dependent framework, as the phenomena which contributes most to the
changes within the linear relation may differently impinge it according to the state of
the economy. For instance, if the response of employment depends to some extent to the
degree of accommodation of monetary policy, and if the transmission channels activated
by the latter are more effective in recessions (or expansions), we should expect the effects
of switches in the monetary policy regime (e.g., the parameters of the Taylor rule) to
impact differently in recessions vis-à-vis expansions.
In order to perform our analysis we divide the sample into two sub-periods. In par-
ticular, we consider a pre-Volcker era (1957:1-1979:2) and a Volcker-Greenspan-Bernanke
period (1984:1-2011:4), which includes the Great Recession.12 The inclusion of the Great
Recession in our second sub-sample follows from Ng and Wright (2013) who claim that the
post mid 80s recessions share a relevant set of common features (e.g., financial origins;
jobless recoveries; tight credit in the ensuing expansions), among which is the shift of
labor productivity from procyclical to countercyclical (see also Fernald and Wang, 2015).
The Tsay tests reject linearity in both samples, as reported in Table 2, even though
12We follow Gali et al. (2003) and exclude the 1979:3-1982:2 period from the analysis. Moreover,
following the existing literature about the timing of the Great Moderation, we start our second sub-
sample in 1984:1 (see e.g., Stock and Watson, 2003).
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Figure 5: Generalized impulse response functions. Cumulative response of hours (upper
row) and GDP (bottom row) with respect to a 1% standard deviation positive shock
to adjusted TFP shock. Recessions (left column) vs. expansions (right column). 68%
confidence bands. Sample: 1957-1979.
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Figure 6: Generalized impulse response functions. Cumulative response of hours (upper
row) and GDP (bottom row) with respect to a 1% standard deviation positive shock
to adjusted TFP shock. Recessions (left column) vs. expansions (right column). 68%
confidence bands. Sample: 1984-2011.
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the evidence for the second sub-sample is weaker (10% significance level). However, notice
that for the specification in which hours and GDP are normalized with the US population
linearity is still rejected at 5%.
Figure 4 displays the threshold variable, the estimated threshold value and recessions
for the two sub-periods. The threshold value does not change within the pre-Volcker period
as to the whole sample, it is lower in the post eighties sample. Moreover, the estimated
lag relevant for the regime switching increases from one to three in the second sub-period.
We find 43 observations in expansion and 47 in recessions in the first sub-samples, while
50 and 62 observations in the latter one.
Let us now consider the GIRFs for the two sub-samples. The results of the pre-Volcker
period are qualitatively similar to ones obtained with the whole sample (cf. Figure 5).
More precisely, the negative effects of positive technology shocks on employment are
abundantly stronger and negative in downturns. In fact, within this subperiod the effects
appear even reinforced with respect to what observed for the whole sample. The point
estimates of the response of GDP itself, although not significantly different from zero,
turn negative after few quarters.
On the contrary, in the second sub-period, the generalized impulse response functions
depict a different story. In this case, the responses in good times do not qualitatively
change, but the ones in bad times are completely different (see Figure 6). Indeed, positive
technology shocks appear to stimulate both GDP and hours during recessions. Our results
are more general than those in Gali et al. (2003) and Galí and Gambetti (2009): the milder
effects of TFP shocks since the mid eighties are due to the responses of hours and GDP
in bad times.
What is the source of the different dynamics of employment in the two subperiods?
We now study disaggregated employment series comparing the dynamics of number of
employees (extensive margin) with average weekly hours per worker (intensive margin).
The impulse response functions of average weekly hours show small differences in the
dynamics of the series after a technology shock in the two sub-samples (Figures 7 and 8).
In both regimes, the initial response is negative and the patterns of the GIRFs is substan-
tially flat. However, in the second period the response over the intensive margin during
recession is close to zero and never positive, whereas no similar shift characterizes the
response in good times. On the contrary, the GIRFs of the number of employees closely
tracks (again) the reaction of total hours. This implies that firms mostly adjust employ-
ment over the extensive margin (Figures 7 and 8). Such results cast further doubts on the
real-business-cycle interpretation of technology shocks. Indeed, positive TFP shocks do
not lead to more intense labor effort, but rather they appear to affect employment mostly
via an aggregate demand channel. In Section 6 we elaborate more on this by enriching
our analysis with further series.
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Figure 7: Generalized impulse response functions. Cumulative response of average weekly
hours (upper row) and of the number of employees (bottom row) with respect to a 1%
standard deviation positive shock to adjusted TFP shock. Recessions (left column) vs.
expansions (right column). Sample: 1957-1979.
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Figure 8: Generalized impulse response functions. Cumulative response of average weekly
hours (upper row) and of the number of employees (bottom row) with respect to a 1%
standard deviation positive shock to adjusted TFP shock. Recessions (left column) vs.
expansions (right column). Sample: 1984-2011.
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5.3 Robustness analysis
Let us assess the robustness of our results as to modifications in the setup of our exercise.
First, we normalize GDP and hours by dividing the series by the US civilian population.
Second, we change the threshold values in the different samples. Finally, we control for
the timing of the break. Indeed, in addition to the pre and post Volcker sub-periods,
we also consider the dates for possible structural breaks in U.S. labor productivity (i.e.,
1973:2; 1995:4; 2003:4) proposed by Fernald (2007, 2014). We accordingly obtain three
different sub-periods: 1957:1-1973:2, 1984:1-1995:4 and 1996:1-2003:4.
Normalized GDP and hours. In the benchmark model, GDP and worked hours are
expressed in aggregate terms. We test the robustness of our result by normalizing the
series by the civilian population as in Gali (1999). Again, both GDP and hours are held in
first differences. The results are qualitatively similar. First, the Tsay tests reject linearity
in all the samples (cf. Table 2). Second, we obtain the same results reported above for the
i) full sample; ii) pre-Volcker period; iii) Great Moderation cum Great Recession period.
Moreover, the results are confirmed for the pre-Volcker vs. post mid 80s period even when
we consider normalized hours in levels as suggested by Christiano et al. (2003).
Different threshold values. Since our results may be sensitive to the value and the
number of lags of the estimated threshold, we check whether they are robust to changes
in the estimation procedure. First, we employ the median value of the threshold variable
at each lag. Second, we perform estimation searching for the model minimizing the sum
of squared residuals at all lags. Again, the results do not qualitatively change.
Different sub-samples. With respect to our sub-sampling strategy, another possible
source of breaks stems from the rate of growth of labor productivity. Indeed, according to
Fernald (2007, 2014), labor productivity growth has been characterized by major changes
over the post WWII periods, with high growth periods (1957-1973 and 1996-2003) being
followed by low growth years (1974-1995 and 2004-2011). Starting from our sub-samples
(1957-1979 and 1984-2011), we narrow our analysis controlling whether our results change
if we concentrate upon shorter time periods, namely, the pre-Volcker high productivity
growth periods (1957-1973); the Great Moderation low productivity growth era (1984-
1995), and the Great Moderation high productivity growth sample (1996-2003).13 We
find that the results do not qualitatively differ from those obtained from our main sub-
samples.
13We excluded from our analysis the pre-Volcker low productivity growth sample (1974-1979), given the
extremely limited amount of observations. We also did not considered the last low productivity growth
period (2004-2011), as the last results would be strongly affected by the Great Recession.
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6 Transmission mechanisms
The previous results showed that the relationship between technology shocks, GDP and
employment changed over time in the two regimes. There are several possible explanations
of such variations. Broken trends in productivity dynamics (e.g., Fernald, 2007, 2014) can
be responsible for significant changes occurred to the correlations among productivity,
hours and output. Moreover, the literature on the Great Moderation (e.g., Gali et al.,
2003; Galí and Gambetti, 2009) has already shown that the effects of technology shocks
on employment become milder the last thirty years.
During the Great Moderation, not only the U.S. output volatility considerably fell, but
the very characteristics of the business cycles changed deeply (Ng and Wright, 2013, i.e.,
long but weak expansions; vanishing pro-cyclicality of labor productivity; pronounced
leverage cycle; jobless recoveries; tight availability of credit creating headwinds to the
recovery). If the long-run relationship between productivity and unemployment is influ-
enced by the volatility of the former one (Benigno et al., 2015), the Great Moderation
can be a source of regime change in the relation between the two. More specifically, if
the benefits of a reduced GDP volatility are greater in recessions than in expansions, the
relationship among technology, employment and output can change.
Competing explanations have been advanced to explain the Great Moderation, namely
good luck and smaller shocks (Stock and Watson, 2003); better monetary policy (Clar-
ida et al., 2000); better fiscal policy (Gordon, 2005); falling private investment volatility
(Justiniano and Primiceri, 2008); ICT revolution and improved inventories management
(Kahn et al., 2002); skill-biased technical change (Cantore et al., 2012a); labor market re-
forms, deunionization and performance pay (Nucci and Riggi, 2011); financial innovations
(Dynan et al., 2006).
By augmenting our benchmark TVAR model with a variable each time capturing a
possible source of the Great Moderation, we try to shed more light on how GDP and
hours react to technology shocks before and after the mid 80s.14 Our results should be
considered with the caveat that we are not likely to find a clear cut cause for such a
shift, but an “impressionistic” picture of the possible channel of variations. The battery
of the impulse response functions (in Appendix D) associated to the possible explanatory
mechanisms document several interesting shifts in the two periods.15
14Note that we do not exclude the Great Recession from the sample, as it shares many characteristics
with the post eighty recessions Ng and Wright (2013). Nevertheless, our results are robust to the sample
choice.
15As to the Cholesky order of the variables in the four dimensional TVAR, we adopt different choices
depending on the characteristic of the each additional series. More precisely, we reserve the first position
for TFP and we order second aggregate demand components (i.e., private investment and its components;
government spending; private consumption and its components; private inventories). We place inflation as
third variable, assuming that it responds immediately to GDP shocks but only with a lag to fundamental
shocks to hours worked. Finally, we order credit spreads and wages as last. Robustness checks in which
we have switched the order of the variable show that our results do not qualitatively change.
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Monetary policy. Although the role of better monetary policy as a source of the Great
Moderation is not undisputed (Clarida et al., 2000; Stock and Watson, 2003), we know
from Gali et al. (2003) and Galí and Gambetti (2009) that an accommodative monetary
policy is crucial in affecting the response of employment to technology shocks (see also
Inoue and Rossi, 2011). We add inflation to our TVAR model16 and we compute the
generalized impulse response function as to TFP shocks. The GIRFs show that the
behavior of inflation in the aftermath of a technology shock is rather different within the
two sub-samples under examination (Figure 10). In particular, the response of inflation
is abundantly negative in recessions within the pre-Volcker era. The opposite holds in the
post mid 80s sample. Thus, a change in the policy rule may have contributed to generate
the observed results.
Fiscal policies. According to Gordon (2005), the reduction in volatility of government
spending is one of the main sources of the Great Moderation. In our framework, fiscal
policy may dampen the impact of technology shocks. We then add to our TVAR model
government consumption expenditures or gross investment, and finally take into account
the dynamics of public deficit. Let us start from government gross investment. There
is a striking difference between its response in bad times during the two time periods
(Figure 11). Indeed, technology shocks depress government gross investment in the pre-
Volcker period, but they strongly and positively impact it in the post mid 80s sub-sample.
Moreover, there is a change in the composition of government spending in recessions with
a greater weight attached to investment vs. consumption within the second sub-sample.17
Indeed, government consumption remains rather low in recessions within the post mid 80s
period (Figure 12). Finally, government deficit shows an improvement in fiscal balance in
the aftermath of TFP shocks in recessions (Figure 13).
Private investment. Here we consider ICT investment, fixed nonresidential investment
and fixed residential investment. Investment may have had a major role in explaining
the different emerging patterns in the two sub-samples. for instance, the rise of ICT
investment and the computer revolution may have contributed to skill-biased technical
change (Acemoglu, 2002; Cantore et al., 2012a,b). Moreover, falling investment adjusting
costs may be at the roots of the Great Moderation (Justiniano and Primiceri, 2008;
Inoue and Rossi, 2011). Let us start from ICT investment, whose share in nonresidential
investment changed from 5% in the 50s to more than 20% in the late 90s. The pattern of
its response to positive technology shocks in bad times closely tracks that of government
gross investment. As shown in Figure 14, tech shocks strongly depress it in the first
subperiod, whereas exactly the opposite holds within the Volcker-Greenspan-Bernanke
era. Not much happens in good times: the reaction is positive in both period but weaker
16This is line with Gali et al. (2003). A TVAR including real interest rates as an additional control
variable returns qualitatively similar results.
17The role of government gross investment in affecting consumers and producers expectations in reces-
sions is emphasized by Bachmann and Sims (2012).
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in the second one. Private nonresidential fixed investment tracks the response of ICT
investment and does not need further discussion (Figure 15). Residential investment
behaves very differently as it positively reacts to technology shocks in recessions in both
samples, as displayed in Figure 16.
Inventories. One of the main sources of the Great Moderation is constituted by the
improvements in the inventory management due to the ICT revolution (see Kahn et al.,
2002; Davis and Kahn, 2008, among others). In our framework, we would expect a much
less volatile response after the mid 80s. Moreover, inventories dynamics could provide an
explanation for our state dependent results, if the responses in recessions are relatively
smaller. However, as documented by Figure 17, this is not the case. In particular, the
response of inventories is mute in good times, whereas the same does not hold in reces-
sions. Such results suggest that inventories management does not constitute a relevant
explanation of the time-dependent patterns of the interrelations between technology and
employment.
Private consumption. During the Great Moderation the volatility of private invest-
ment, but also of consumption fell considerably (see e.g. Canova, 2009). The responses
of the three components of consumption (e.g. durable, nondurable and service consump-
tion) are quite close within the pre-Volcker era, especially on impact (Figures from 18 to
20). At the same time, they are characterized by similar, an abundantly higher responses
in recessions during the second sub-samples. Technology shocks, either because of the
changing nature of technological change or because of a shift in accomodative policies,
appear to act like a broad stimulus for the entire economy.
Financial frictions. For Dynan et al. (2006) and Cecchetti et al. (2006), the Great
Moderation is strictly linked to financial development. Moreover, pronounced leverage (ex
ante) and tight credit in recoveries are one of the qualifying characteristics of the post mid
80s recessions (Ng and Wright, 2013). We now study the possible change in the reaction
of credit markets after a technology shock since the mid 80s, by assessing the response of
the spread between the BAA-rated corporate bonds and the 10-year constant maturity
Treasury rate (Figure 23). Moreover we do also check for the response of the BAA-AAA
rated corporate bonds spread (Figure 24). We find that the reaction of credit markets
in the face of technology shocks is much more accommodating in recessions within the
second sub-sample.
Labor market. Labor market reforms may have contributed to the Great Moderation
(Stiroh, 2009) and provide an explanation of milder effects of technology shocks on em-
ployment (Nucci and Riggi, 2011). We start analyzing the behavior of nominal and real
wages in relation to technology shocks. The response of nominal wage is rather similar
in the two states within different regimes (Figure 21), but we find a shift (in both states)
from the first to the second sub-sample. Indeed, the GIRFs identify a negative response
within the pre-Volcker era, but a rather positive one in the second period. The responses
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of real wage are positive in both states and regimes (Figure 22). In this case a relevant role
is played by inflation dynamics. Again however, the difference between the two regimes
does not seem to be so relevant. We then consider the share of part time employment.
Indeed, the rising share of part time employment vis-à-vis total one could explain the
positive response of hours in bad times. However, such conjecture is not supported by the
impulse response functions, which shows a rise of non part time workers in the aftermath
of a technology shock since the mid eighties.18
Taking stock. The foregoing results appear to show that monetary and fiscal policies,
private investment dynamics, and financial frictions have had a major role in switching
the response of employment from negative to positive after a technology shock during
recessions since the beginning of the Great Moderation. In particular, the big shift in
the responses of public as well as private nonresidential investment and ICT in the low
growth periods since the mid 80s seems to suggest the importance of aggregate demand
transmission mechanisms during downturns. Finally, the responses of wage and inventories
dynamics do not seem to add a convincing alternative channel working either throughout
the functioning of the labor market or through a more efficient firms’ management of the
supply chain.19
7 Concluding remarks
In the current work, we contribute to the literature about the short-run effects of technol-
ogy shocks on employment and output by showing that there are diverse effects arising
from different states of th economy. Indeed, the impulse response functions resulting from
our TVAR model show that positive technology shocks spur GDP in expansions, while
their impact is not significantly different from zero in downturns. On the contrary, TFP
shocks have contractionary effects on hours in recessions, but they are not significantly
different from zero in good times. Our results generalize the work of Gali (1999) and Basu
et al. (2006). We also find that the response of aggregate hours to TFP shocks is mainly
driven by the reaction of the number of employees (extensive margin) rather than hours
per worker (intensive margin).
Beyond state depend effects, in line with the prevailing literature (e.g., Gali et al.,
2003; Galí and Gambetti, 2009), we also uncover structural breaks in the reaction of
GDP and employment to technology shocks. Indeed, during the Great Moderation, TFP
shocks stimulate both hours and output in recessions. We then study possible transmission
18The impulse response functions are not reported. They are available from the authors upon request.
19A not formally tested alternative explanation resides in the response of the real exchange rate in
the two sub-periods. Unfortunately the length of the series (1964:1–) does not allow us to follow the
same approach applied here in the pre-Volcker era. Nevertheless, results for the after mid eighties sample
show that the US real exchange rate does not rise in recession in the aftermath of a technology shock,
contrary to what happens in good times. Whereas a persistent fall follows tech shocks in both states in
the pre-Volcker era. We thank Katarina Juselius for this suggestion.
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channels that could contribute to explain the different patterns observed in the two sub-
samples. We find that better stabilization policies, enhanced ICT investment, and lower
financial frictions could be responsible for the different responses of GDP and hours before
and after the mid eighties.
Our research can be expanded in at least three directions. First, we can further study
the transmission channels responsible for the different patterns observed in the Great
Moderation employing e.g. alternative identification schemes such as the one proposed in
Moneta et al. (2012). Second, we could employ wavelet analysis (Gallegati et al., 2014) to
uncover possible changing patterns in the relation between employment and productivity
at different time scales. Finally, nonlinear cointegration analysis (Enders, 2008; Candelon
and Lieb, 2013) could be applied to assess whether the long- and short-run relations
among technology, GDP and employment are affected by regime dependent dynamics as
well as the by the structural change observed in the mid eighties.
.
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Appendices
A Data
Data on adjusted TFP and aggregate hours worked are recovered from Fernald (2012)’s
database (http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/economists/john-fernald/#).
Both series are in annualized rates of growth but transformed in quarterly rates of change
for the analysis.
Further data are from the FRED database (http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/)
provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and transformed in order to get real
values through the most appropriate deflator. The series employed in the empirical anal-
ysis are:
• Gross Domestic Product (GDP);
• GDP Implicit Deflator (GDPDEF);
• Nonfarm Business Sector: Hours of All Persons (HOANBS);
• Nonfarm Business Sector: Employment (PRS85006013);
• Nonfarm Business Sector: Average Weekly Hours (PRS85006023);
• Employment Level: Nonagricultural Industries (LNS12035019);
• Employment Level: Part-Time for Economic Reasons, Nonagricultural Industries
(LNS12032197);
• Employment Level: Part-Time for Noneconomic Reasons, Nonagricultural Indus-
tries (LNS12032200);
• Federal Government Consumption Expenditures (A957RC1Q027SBEA);
• Government Consumption Expenditures: State and Local (A991RC1Q027SBEA);
• Government Consumption Expenditures and Gross Investment Implicit Price De-
flator (A822RD3Q086SBEA);
• Government Gross Investment: Federal National Defense Gross Investment (DGI)
+ Federal Nondefense Gross Investment (NDGI) + State and Local Government
Gross Investment (SLINV);
• Gross Government Saving (GGSAVE);
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• Private Fixed Investment in Information Processing Equipment and Software (ICT)
(A679RC1Q027SBEA);
• Private Nonresidential Fixed Investment (PNFI);
• Gross Private Domestic Investment: Fixed Investment: Nonresidential Implicit
Price Deflator (A008RD3Q086SBEA);
• Private Residential Fixed Investment (PRFI);
• Gross Private Domestic Investment: Fixed Investment: Residential Implicit Price
Deflator (A011RD3Q086SBEA);
• Personal Consumption Expenditures: Nondurable Goods (PCND);
• Private Consumption Expenditures: Nondurable Goods Implicit Price Deflator
(DNDGRD3Q086SBEA);
• Personal Consumption Expenditures: Durable Goods (PCDG);
• Private Consumption Expenditures: Durable Goods Implicit Price Deflator (DDURRD3Q086SBEA);
• Personal Consumption Expenditures: Services (PCESV);
• Private Consumption Expenditures: Services Implicit Price Deflator (DSERRD3Q086SBEA);
• Change in Private Inventories (CBI);
• Nonfarm Business Sector: Compensation Per Hour (COMPNFB);
• Nonfarm Business Sector: Real Compensation Per Hour (COMPRNFB);
• Moody’s Seasoned BAA Corporate Bond Yield (BAA);
• Moody’s Seasoned AAA Corporate Bond Yield (AAA);
• 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate (GS10);
• Civilian Noninstitutional Population (CNP16OV).
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B Generalized Impulse Response Functions
The algorithm to get the generalized impulse response function (GIRF) specific to each
regime with R observations works as follows (see Baum and Koester, 2011):
1. pick a history Ωrt−1;
2. pick a sequence of shocks by bootstrapping the residuals of the TVAR taking into
account the different variance-covariance matrix characterizing each regime;
3. given the history Ωrt−1, the estimated TVAR coefficients and bootstrapped residuals,
simulate the evolution of the model over the period of interest;
4. repeat the previous exercise by adding a new shock at time 0;
5. repeat B times the steps from 2 to 4;
6. compute the average difference between the shocked path on the non-shocked one;
7. repeat steps from 1 to 6 over all the possible starting points;
8. compute the average GIRF associated with a particular regime with R observations
as:
yt+m(ε0) =
1
R
R∑
r=1
yt+m(Ω
r
t−1|ε0, ε∗t+m)− yt+m(Ωrt−1|ε∗t+m)
B
Once GIRFs are obtained, we apply the algorithm in Schmidt (2013) to compute the
related confidence bands:
1. artificial data are generated recursively using the estimated coefficients and errors
from the TVAR structure;
2. using the recursive dataset, the TVAR regression coefficients and the error terms
are calculated assuming that the threshold corresponds to the estimated value;
3. employing the original dataset and the newly computed coefficients and errors,
GIRFs are computed following the steps described above;
4. steps 1-3 are repeated S = 500 times to generate a sample distribution of the GIRFs
from which confidence bands are drawn at the respective significance level.
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C Series
Figure 9: Series (first difference of natural logarithm). NBER recessions in parenthesis
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D Generalized Impulse Response Functions: Transmis-
sion Channels
Figure 10: Response of inflation with respect to a 1% sd positive shock to adjusted TFP
in recessions (dashed lines) and expansions (solid line). 1957-1979 vs. 1984-2011
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Figure 11: Response of government gross investment with respect to a 1% sd positive
shock to adjusted TFP in recessions (dashed lines) and expansions (solid line). 1957-1979
vs. 1984-2011
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Figure 12: Response of government consumption expenditures with respect to a 1% sd
positive shock to adjusted TFP in recessions (dashed lines) and expansions (solid line).
1957-1979 vs. 1984-2011
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Figure 13: Response of public deficit with respect to a 1% sd positive shock to adjusted
TFP in recessions (dashed lines) and expansions (solid line). 1957-1979 vs. 1984-2011
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Figure 14: Response of ICT investment with respect to a 1% sd positive shock to adjusted
TFP in recessions (dashed lines) and expansions (solid line). 1957-1979 vs. 1984-2011
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Figure 15: Response of non residential fixed investment with respect to a 1% sd positive
shock to adjusted TFP in recessions (dashed lines) and expansions (solid line). 1957-1979
vs. 1984-2011
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(b) 1984-2011
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Figure 16: Response of residential fixed investment with respect to a 1% sd positive shock
to adjusted TFP in recessions (dashed lines) and expansions (solid line). 1957-1979 vs.
1984-2011
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Figure 17: Response of inventories with respect to a 1% sd positive shock to adjusted
TFP in recessions (dashed lines) and expansions (solid line). 1957-1979 vs. 1984-2011
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Figure 18: Response of private nondurable goods consumption with respect to a 1% sd
positive shock to adjusted TFP in recessions (dashed lines) and expansions (solid line).
1957-1979 vs. 1984-2011
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Figure 19: Response of private durable goods consumption with respect to a 1% sd positive
shock to adjusted TFP in recessions (dashed lines) and expansions (solid line). 1957-1979
vs. 1984-2011
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Figure 20: Response of private services consumption with respect to a 1% sd positive
shock to adjusted TFP in recessions (dashed lines) and expansions (solid line). 1957-1979
vs. 1984-2011
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(b) 1984-2011
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Figure 21: Response of nominal wage with respect to a 1% sd positive shock to adjusted
TFP in recessions (dashed lines) and expansions (solid line). 1957-1979 vs. 1984-2011
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Figure 22: Response of real wage with respect to a 1% sd positive shock to adjusted TFP
in recessions (dashed lines) and expansions (solid line). 1957-1979 vs. 1984-2011
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Figure 23: Response of BAA spread with respect to a 1% sd positive shock to adjusted
TFP in recessions (dashed lines) and expansions (solid line). 1957-1979 vs. 1984-2011
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Figure 24: Response of AAA spread with respect to a 1% sd positive shock to adjusted
TFP in recessions (dashed lines) and expansions (solid line). 1957-1979 vs. 1984-2011
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